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In 2015, PennEast Pipeline Co. sought a Natural Gas Act required certificate from the FERC to 
build a natural gas pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey.[i] Before FERC decided whether 







32569f24dcd0)funding structure creates structural bias, in violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, by incentivizing the Commission to approve new pipelines in order to secure 
additional sources for its future funding”.[ii] The DC Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the 
District Court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a claim.[iii] Riverkeeper asserted the phrase 
“[t]he people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the environment” from a Pennsylvania Constitutional amendment, 
created a federally recognizable property interest.[iv] The court concluded that the amendment does 
not create a federal constitutional right.[v] Also, the court ruled that the stated property interest is 
too abstract and does not carry the same recognizable characteristics as other property rights, such as 
the right to exclude.[vi] 
 The court also addressed the issue of FERC being a biased adjudicator.[vii] Due process requires an 
"impartial and disinterested" adjudicator.[viii] In Tumey v Ohio, the Court held that an adjudicator 
cannot have "a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest" in reaching a particular outcome.[ix] 
While FERC’s budget is set by Congress,[x] “the Budget Act requires FERC to ‘assess and collect’ 
from the various industries that it regulates ‘fees and annual charges in any fiscal year in amounts 
equal to all of the costs incurred by the Commission in that fiscal year.’”[xi] The court concluded 
that the FERC is not a biased adjudicator.[xii] The court analogizes this case to Dugan, which held 
that a mayor was not biased because he served as one member of a five member city commission and 
had no actual ability to unilaterally make decisions, because the budget for the year is set by 
Congress and thus there is no ability to receive additional funding based on whether the pipeline is 
approved or not.[xiii] Also, the court found it persuasive that the fees are credited to the treasury 
rather than directly to FERC.[xiv] 
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I am not persuaded by the court’s reasoning in this case. I believe it is clear that there exists no 
definable property interest. However, it seems preposterous that FERC is not seen as a biased 
adjudicator. The court mentions a case that is intermediately between Dugan, who had no say at all, 
and Tumey, whose pay was based on money collected.[xv] In Ward, the mayor’s pay was not based on 
convictions; however, he was still held to be biased because it “created an impermissible incentive for 
the mayor ‘to maintain the high level of contribution from [his] court.’”[xvi] The main nail in the 
coffin in Ward was that the mayor retained executive control and the mere “possible temptation” was 
enough.[xvii] As the court in Ward concluded the existence of bias, so should have this court. 
The first issue of the set budget by Congress does not mean bias does not exist. The mayor’s salary 
was fixed in Ward.[xviii] Fees charged by FERC are based solely on the “costs incurred by the 
Commission in that fiscal year.”[xix] However, the commission can and likely will be allocated larger 
budgets based on the amount of revenue brought in. While the commission does not decide the 
budget, it does present a proposed budget to Congress for approval.[xx] FERC also has authority to 
determine the amount of the fee and is even allowed to waive fees for “good cause.”[xxi] This case 
seems more like Ward than Dugan because Dugan was one vote of five on an executive/judicial 
panel.[xxii] Hence, Dugan did not have power to act on his own. Ward was allotted some executive 
control and judicial control.[xxiii] This case is clearly one where FERC retains most of the executive 
and judicial control. 
 The second issue, the money being paid to the treasury rather than FERC, is not enough to prove 
persuasive. The fees charged are based on the budget approved by Congress.[xxiv] Obviously, the 
money is directed to FERC; just because it is temporarily put somewhere else is not enough to 
prevent actual bias or the appearance of bias.[xxv]
 In conclusion, this case was rightfully decided in the sense that there is no clearly defined liberty or 
property interest at issue, however, it seems clear to me that the adjudicator is biased and had there 
been a cognizable liberty or property interest, this case would have been a clear violation of due 
process. 
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